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Arbitration and beyond:Avoiding
pitfalls in drafting dispute resolution
clauses in employment contracts
ou've just helped a mid-sized com-
pany, Allwell Corp., to reach a settle-
ment in an action brought by a dis-
gruntled former employee. The CEO
turns to you and says, "Even though I
still believe that we didn't do anything
wrong, I'm glad this lawsuit is over. I
can't believe how much money and
time we've wasted in defending our-
selves. Now, how can we keep this
from happening in the future? I've
been reading about companies putting
arbitration clauses in all kinds of con-
tracts. I want to know whether we can
require our employees to arbitrate-
and maybe even require them to at-
tempt mediation before arbitration-
rather than sue us." The CEO tells you
to report back by the end of the week.
You know that labor contracts often in-
clude provisions for arbitration and me-
diation of grievances. Even though
Allwell has a non-union shop, can you
just find a clause in a labor contract and
cut and paste it into the company's per-
sonnel policy?
Well, no. If you want to be sure that
your proposed "dispute resolution
clause" is enforceable, you will need to
be more careful in your drafting. This
article is designed to warn you about
some of the pitfalls you can and should
avoid in developing dispute resolution
clauses. Because the guidance is
clearer for arbitration clauses, we will
begin there. The article will then dis-
cuss drafting pitfalls applicable to
clauses that provide for the use of other
dispute resolution processes.
Federal Arbitration Act
Congress and the Supreme Court have
combined to send strong signals encour-
aging parties to insert arbitration clauses
into all sorts of contracts. In 1925, Con-
gress passed the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA). Commercial arbitration is
grounded in this statute.' Section 2 of
the FAA specifically provides:
A written provision in any
maritime transaction or a con-
tract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle
by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole
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or any part thereof, or an agree-
ment in writing to submit to ar-
bitration an existing controversy
arising out of such contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
able, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.2
The FAA definitely is not a model of draft-
ing clarity but, through a series of decisions,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the
above-quoted language in order to make its
main message clear.
First, the Supreme
Court concluded that
with the passage of the To be on
FAA, the Congress had
declared a national OU A
policy favoring bind-
ing arbitration. Sec-
ond, the Supreme arbitrat
Court ruled that the
FAA preempted the used
states' power to force fe r
parties to use the
courts when the par- claims a
ties had entered into
agreements providing the en
for binding arbitra-
tion.3  Then, in a se-ralO
ries of opinions, the
Supreme Court made
it clear that if parties
entered into agreements to use arbitration
to resolve disputes, the courts would en-
force those agreements.t
If that were the entire story, there would
be no need to be careful in drafting arbi-
tration clauses. Not surprisingly, how-
ever, there are exceptions to the general
rule established by the FAA and the Su-
preme Court's decisions. The language
of Section 2 of the FAA is the source of
many of those exceptions. This leads to
our discussion of drafting pitfalls for ar-
bitration clauses.
Drafting "pitfalls" for
arbitration clauses
Pitfall #1: You assume that the FAA does
not apply to your arbitration clause be-
cause it will be part of an employment
agreement, not a maritime contract or
a contract involving a "commercial"
transaction.
If you read the quoted language care-
fully, you noticed that the FAA does not
apply unless an arbitration clause is "part
of a maritime contract or a contract evi-
he safe side,
y consider
ying that
ion will be
o resolve
l statutory
rising out of
mployment
ship as well.
dencing a trans-
action involving
c o m m e rc e. "
Which contracts
"evidence a trans-
action involving
commerce?" Did
the Congress use
this language as a
means to place
some limits on
the reach of the
FAA? Or, does
every contract
evidence a trans-
action involving
commerce?
For a while,
courts differed in
their answers to
these questions. This was significant be-
cause the answer determined the pre-
emptive reach of the FAA. If the FAA
were interpreted as applying to only a
narrow class of contracts, states would
be able to place substantial limits on the
enforcement of arbitration clauses in the
majority of contracts. If the FAA were
interpreted broadly, states would largely
be preempted from placing limits on con-
tractual arbitration.
In two relatively recent decisions, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the expansive in-
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terpretation of the FAA in invalidating
states' efforts to place special limits on
arbitration agreements.' This has led
various commentators to conclude that
the FAA governs "virtually all arbitration
in the United States, in state as well as
in federal courts."6
What does this mean for you? Simply,
you will need to be
guided by the FAA
as you write the ar-
bitration clause for Courts cu
Allwell's employ-
ment contract. employir
Pitfall #2: You as- confusin
sume that an arbi- tests as
tration clause will
be enforceable re- determir
gardless of the types
of employees cov- to enforc
ered by the clause. ingAD
Section 1 of the FAA
specifically pro- -
vides: "Nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad em-
ployees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce." What does this mean? In today's
global economy, most workers have some
involvement in interstate or foreign com-
merce. Does this mean that the FAA does
not apply to arbitration clauses in agree-
ments between any of these employees
and their employers?
Despite the language of the FAA quoted
above, the FAA has been applied to indi-
vidual employment contracts in a wide
variety of situations.t In addition sev-
eral federal circuit courts have held that
only workers in transportation industries
are excluded from FAA coverage. Be-
yond this, some courts have held that
only the workers who are directly in-
volved in transportation or in the actual
rr
ig
th
e
e
R
movement of goods are excluded.9 How-
ever, it is worth noting that case law in-
terpreting this provision in Section 1 of
the FAA is not totally consistent.
So let's imagine that Allwell is a mid-sized
trucking company that ships products and
materials across the country. Half of the
employees are truck drivers while the re-
mainder work in
1the office or in the
ently are Allwell's CEO wants
a rather the arbitrationclause to apply to
array ~fall employees.array, of
ey try to You can be quite
whetherconfident that 
the
w etherFAA will not apply
non-bind- to the truck driversand thus the FAA
clauses will not ensure the
enforcement of
your arbitration
clause as it applies
to these employ-
ees. On the other hand, assuming that
your arbitration clause satisfies all of the
other requirements of the FAA, it appears
relatively likely that it will be enforced
as it applies to the office and warehouse
workers.
Pitfall #3: You assume that your arbitra-
ion clause will apply to all claims aris-
ing out of the employment relationship.
Section 2 of the FAA, which is quoted
above, provides that arbitration clauses
will be enforceable "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract." Guided
by this language, courts have refused to
require arbitration if they find that the
parties did not intend the arbitration
clause to encompass certain claims or is-
sues.i0 Importantly, however, courts gen-
erally resolve questions concerning the
37
Avoiding pitfalls in drafting dispute resolution clauses
scope of arbitration clauses in favor of ar-
bitration. And in the case of broadly
worded arbitration clauses, the presump-
tion favoring arbitration is applied with
even greater force." (For instance, arbi-
tration clauses covering "any disputes" or
any "other disputes" in an employment
contract generally have been found broad
enough to encompass statutory claims,
such as those made pursuant to Title
VII. 12)
However, courts sometimes have invali-
dated the application of arbitration
clauses to particu-
lar statutory claims,
even when the em-
ployment contract Despite th
contains broad lan-
guage indicating of the
that the clause is
meant to apply to the Act
all disputes arising
out of the employ-
ment relationship. individual e
Why?
contra
An arbitration
clause may not ap-
ply to a federal
statutory claim if
Congress has ex-
pressed an explicit
and specific intent either to make such
statutory claims unarbitrable, or to limit
the ability of private parties to enter into
a contract waiving the federal statute's
protections. Under these circumstances,
a court may find that Congress has
"trumped" the FAA with another federal
statute. 13 For example, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently found that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes the
compulsory arbitration of civil rights
claims and that employees cannot be
required to waive their right to bring
Title VII claims in court as a condition
of employment."4 importantly, many
other courts disagree with this conclu-
sion and have found that Congress did
not intend Title VII to "trump" the FAA
to this extent.15
If you want the arbitration clause in
Allwell's personnel policy to apply to all
disputes arising out of the employment
relationship, not just those explicitly aris-
ing out of the policy itself, you should
use broad language that conveys this in-
tent. In addition, to be on the safe side,
you may consider specifying that arbi-
tration will be used to resolve federal
statutory claims
e language
FAA,
has been
ed to
mployment
~cts in a
variety
UatiOnS.
arising out of the em-
ployment relation-
ship as well.
Pitfall #4: You as-
sume that you can
limit the remedies
that are available
to your employees.
Since Allwell can re-
quire its employees
to arbitrate all dis-
putes arising out of
the employment re-
lationship, can the
company also limit
their remedies? For
example, can the ar-
bitration clause pro-
vide that employees
will be able to recover only for breach of
contract claims? Can the clause provide
that employees cannot recover punitive
damages?
Quite simply, the answer is no. Allwell
can restrict its employees to a particular
forum, but the company cannot require
them to waive substantive relief and rem-
edies.16 Doing so will endanger the en-
forceability of the arbitration clause.
Pitfall #5: You assume that all of the ad-
ministrative terms of your clause will be
enforceable.
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Of course, your clause will provide that
all disputes arising out of an individual's
employment at Allwell will be resolved
through arbitration. However, it is very
possible that your clause will go further,
specifying the organization that will sup-
ply the arbitrators, how individual arbi-
trators will be selected, how much the
arbitrators will be paid, and who will be
responsible for paying them. There are
good administrative reasons for defining
these terms up front, rather than wait-
ing until the first dispute arises to figure
them out.
It is possible that a court could decide to
enforce Allwell's arbitration clause gen-
erally, but invalidate one of these more
detailed administrative matters for the
same reasons described in Pitfall #3. For
example, at least one lower court has
found that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 partially trumps the FAA by
affording employees a nonwaivable right
of reasonable access to a neutral forum.
As a result, the court concluded that an
employer compelling arbitration must
pay the arbitrator's fee.1 7
Pitfall #6: You assume that the enforce-
ability of your arbitration clause will
not be affected by the fact that it is
part of an employment agreement.
Based on the language in Section 2 of the
FAA, courts also have invalidated arbi-
tration clauses based on generally appli-
cable contract defenses such as fraud,
duress, and unconscionability." Courts
have been more likely to deem arbitra-
tion clauses unconscionable when these
clauses are found in "contracts of adhe-
sion." These are contracts imposed by
the party with superior bargaining
strength in situations where the other
party has no effective opportunity to re-
ject the contract and the contract terms
unreasonably favor the party with the
bargaining strength.
The fact that the circumstances surround-
ing contract formation may affect enforce-
ability is especially important in the em-
ployment context. Employees have argued
that in certain situations (for example, if
the employer adds new, more restrictive
terms to an existing personnel policy and
the new terms now apply to a long-time
employee) employment contracts should
be considered contracts of adhesion.
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court
has upheld the enforcement of arbitration
clauses in contracts that could be consid-
ered adhesive-including employment con-
tracts." This obviously is significant. How-
ever, lower courts have not always been as
supportive of arbitration clauses if they find
them in contracts they consider adhesive.
These courts have been willing to find spe-
cific terms contained in an arbitration
clause to be outside the "reasonable expec-
tations" of the weaker or adhering party, or
unduly oppressive or unconscionable pur-
suant to a "principle of equity applicable to
all contracts generally." 0 For example:
a A California court found an arbitration
clause in an employment contract to
be unconscionable where the
employee's statutory remedies were
greatly curtailed, the employer's rem-
edies were embellished, and the agree-
ment was presented as a standard em-
ployment contract after the employee
had commenced her employment.2 1
" An Ohio court found an arbitration
clause to be unconscionable because it
required a party of limited means to
pay an "exorbitant" filing fee to insti-
tute arbitration and the party had un-
knowingly agreed to the clause.2 2
" The California Supreme Court found
an arbitration clause unconscionable
because the arbitrator was presump-
tively biased when the clause named a
particular organization as the arbitra-
tor and the more powerful party was a
member of the named organization.2 3
39
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. The California Court of Appeals re-
fused to enforce an arbitration clause
in a small finance contract, finding it
unconscionable
due to such terms
as selection of a
distant forum and Lowe
required payment
of additional fees. 24  have n
" The United States
Court of Appeals been as
for the Fourth Cir-
cuit refused to re- of arbitr
quire arbitration if they
where the process
was "egregiously in c
unfair" and "ut-
terly lacking in they
the rudiments of ad
even-handed-
ness."2 5
" on the othern
hand, a federal
district court in Minnesota enforced
an arbitration policy that had been
added to a company's employee
manual, finding that the policy lan-
guage was sufficiently definite in
form; the employee received a copy
of the provision at the time it became
effective; the employee continued his
employment with knowledge of the
changed condition; and there had
been no showing that the arbitration
clause was inherently unfair. 2 n
What does all of this mean as you draft
the arbitration clause for Allwell's employ-
ment contract? Because an employment
contract may be found to be a contract of
adhesion, be certain that you:
1. Provide clear notice to employees re-
garding the arbitration clause and
thus provide an opportunity for the
knowing, voluntary waiver of rights.
2. Are clear regarding the scope of is-
sues to be resolved through arbitra-
tion. Do you want arbitration to be
r c
ot
su
Lti
fi
on
cc
he
used to resolve all controversies aris-
ing "under the employment contract"
or all controversies arising "within the
employment rela-
tionship?" If you
want to exempt
ourts certain issuesfrom arbitration,
always be specific.
pporive3. Specify theipportive use of clearly im-
on clauses partial arbitrators
or provide for an
nd them impartial selec-
Ition process, astracts well as thorough
nsiderconflict disclosure)nsider procedures.
sive. 4. Avoid requir-
ing employees to
pay fees or costs
_________that could be con-
sidered excessive
and could be interpreted as inhibit-
ing their access to the arbitration pro-
cess.
5. Plan to hold the arbitrations in loca-
tions convenient for your employees.
Drafting pitfalls for other
ADR processes
Pitfall #7: You assume that if a court
would enforce an arbitration clause, it
would be just as likely to enforce a
clause providing for a different ADR
process.
You've had a lot of good experience with
mediation of employment disputes. You
decide to follow the CEO's lead and write
a "dispute resolution clause" that pro-
vides for the use of a two-step process,
med-arb. First, the company and the em-
ployee will attempt to reach resolution
of the dispute through mediation. if the
dispute is resolved at this stage, there will
be no need to proceed to the second step.
On the other hand, if mediation does not
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment
resolve the matter, then the company
and the employee will enter the second
step, binding arbitration.
You plan to give the employees plenty
of notice, use unquestionably impartial
mediators and arbitrators, and provide
the processes at no charge to the employ-
ees. You have no concerns that the clause
will be considered unconscionable. Be-
cause a court would likely enforce a bind-
ing arbitration clause under these cir-
cumstances, it will be just as ready to en-
force the mediation portion of your med-
arb provision, right? Or wrong?
The answer is not absolutely clear at this
time. It is important to remember that
the courts' general willingness to enforce
arbitration clauses is the direct result of
Congress' endorsement of binding arbi-
tration as described in the FAA.2 7 The
FAA, however, does not reference media-
tion, med-arb, or any other ADR process
besides binding arbitration. And with-
out the direction provided by the FAA, it
is up to the courts to decide whether it
is fair and just to enforce clauses provid-
ing for the use of non-binding ADR
("non-binding ADR clauses").
Courts currently are employing a rather
confusing array of tests as they try to de-
termine whether to enforce non-binding
ADR clauses. Upon examination, three
general strands of analysis emerge from
the cases-and sometimes all three
strands are found in a single case.
FAA analysis. First, a court may ground
its analysis in the FAA, even though the
FAA does not apply to non-binding ADR
clauses. The courts using this approach
have focused on the language in Section
2 of the FAA, which provides for enforce-
ment of "[a] written provision ... to settle
[a controversy] by arbitration...." (Em-
phasis added.) Obviously, binding arbi-
tration is certain to settle a controversy
while non-binding ADR processes do not
guarantee settlement.
This has led some courts to try to deter-
mine whether the ADR process written
into a contract is likely to settle the con-
troversy. If the process does appear
likely to settle the controversy, courts
have been willing to enforce the clause.
On the other hand, when courts have
concluded that nothing will be gained by
forcing one of the parties to use a non-
binding ADR process, they have refused
to compel the performance of such "a
futile or ineffective act."28
Public policy. Second, a court may find
that public policy favors enforcement of
all ADR clauses, not just binding arbitra-
tion. In the cases reflecting this strand
of analysis, the courts appear to view
binding arbitration as the "pioneer" ADR
process, blazing the trail for all of its pro-
cedural cousins to follow. 2 9
Contract law. Last, a court may analyze
a non-binding ADR clause purely in
terms of contract law. The courts using
this approach have begun by determin-
ing whether the parties intended to en-
ter into a non-binding ADR clause.3 0 If
they did, the only remaining question
has been whether or not the parties in-
tended the clause to cover the particu-
lar dispute that has been brought to the
court. When courts have determined
that the dispute falls within the intended
scope of the non-binding ADR clause,
they have enforced the clause.
As part of this analysis, some courts have
invoked exhaustion principles, requiring
that the complaining party exhaust the non-
binding ADR procedures agreed to under
the contract, before he or she can sue based
on alleged breach of the same contract.3 2
Other courts also appear more comfortable
enforcing non-binding ADR clauses where
participation in the ADR process is simply
41
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a condition precedent to bringing suit or
entering into a binding ADR process.33
For courts using the pure contract ap-
proach to determine the enforceability of
these clauses, the generally applicable
contract defenses described earlier will
apply. Interestingly, courts have not
found clauses providing for non-binding
ADR unconscionable-yet.3 1 It is likely
only a matter of time
before non-binding
ADR clauses are
found unconscio-
nable for the same
reasons that have oc-
casionally afflicted
arbitration clauses.
So, what does all of
this suggest as you
draft your med-arb
clause? First, don't
forget all of the tips
for drafting binding
arbitration clauses.
They apply to these
clauses as well. In
addition:
3. Build in procedural safeguards that
make it more likely the process will
result in settlement-e.g., trusted, im-
partial neutrals whose facilitation
skills and/or evaluations are likely to
be taken seriously, and adequate time
for an employee to prepare for and
participate in the process.
4. If you want to guarantee that the pro-
cess will result in settlement, make
Including
ADR clauses
in employment
contracts is one
of the most
effective means
of mainstreaming
ADR.
1. Be clear about the process that you are
using. You may want to describe the
process, rather than merely name it.
2. Indicate that you intend to use the
process to "settle" controversies aris-
ing under the contract.
the non-binding
process a condition
precedent to a
binding ADR pro-
cess.
Conclusion
It can be exciting
and fulfilling to
find ways to "main-
stream" the use of
ADR into the em-
ployment arena.
Including ADR
clauses in employ-
ment contracts is
one of the most ef-
fective means of
mainstreaming ADR. However, poorly
conceived or poorly introduced clauses
can create unnecessary disputes and can
keep employers and employees from
achieving the full potential of ADR. *
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Dec. 24, 1998) (courtfound that parties' shared parenting plan
required consultation, and mediation and arbitration if neces-
sary, regarding schooling of children, that the mother had in-
voked the mediation/arbitration clause, and that the trial court
was acting pursuant to its inherent power to enforce the provi-
sions of its decrees when it ordered the parties to arbitrate this
issue pursuant to the plan); Cecala v. Moore, 982 F Supp.
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